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Abstract
This note deﬁnes and analyzes the most important issues concerning decisionmaking about
human-induced insecurities such as terrorism and organized crime from the perspective of
a policymaker. By means of modeling the policymakers trade-o between the eectiveness
and costs of policy measures targeted at reducing the threat of terrorism, we aim at helping
to understand the role economic research can take to enable ecient decisionmaking in the
context of human-induced insecurities in general and terrorism in particular.
DIW Berlin. Email: jderee@diw.de (Joppe), cmueller@diw.de (Cath´ erine).
11 Introduction
Insecurities are a challenge to many societies, especially if they involve risks of creating major
losses in human lives, property and welfare. Local or national governments are at least partly
responsible for the wellbeing of its inhabitants and are therefore supposed to deal with these inse-
curities. One aspect policymakers are concerned with –and face great diculties with– is making
policy decisions under great uncertainty. The concept of insecurity is quite often associated with
great levels of uncertainty. Insecurity can occur naturally (e.g., natural catastrophes), acciden-
tally (e.g., industrial accidents) or purposefully human-induced. In this paper we are mainly
interested in the analysis of purposefully human-induced insecurities like organized crime or
terrorism. We focus mainly on the issue of terrorism, where the analysis could –in principle–
be straightforwardly extended to other types of human-induced insecurities, such as organized
crime. In particular we are discussing why economists (as social scientists) should be interested
in studying this ﬁeld and how they can help to improve ecient policy decisionmaking.
Economics as a social science is typically associated with the economy as its area of focus.
Economic science and the economy however are not the same thing. Economics as a science
is merely a set of methods, techniques and theories that help us understand the working of
various areas of the economy, for example individual or ﬁrm behavior. The economist’s toolbox
(methods, techniques etc. that are developed by economic science) however may also be applied
todierentareasofresearchthathistoricallyhavebeendomainsofpoliticalscientists, sociologists
or psychologists. We argue that issues related to terrorism and organized crime are such research
areas.
In this note we are discussing the merit of economic research on issues of human-induced
insecurities. We focus on how anti-terror (and anti-organized crime) policymaking can be im-
proved using outcomes of economic research. Policymakers attempt to ﬁght terrorism in a cost
ecient way. Policymakers aim to eectively tradeo the threat of terrorism and the monetary
cost of anti-terror policy. In section (3) we set up a framework that formalizes the decision process
of the policymaker.
By analyzing the policymaker’s decision process we identify two broad categories of research
in the area of terrorism and organized crime: the interdependencies relating policymaking and
terrorism and organized crime on the one hand, and the determination of costs of dierent types
of threats on the other. We are subsequently discussing and classifying some of the existing
literature in either of these two classes. With classifying we mean that we analyze how one can
2use these results to the interest of a policymaker. Our framework logically identiﬁes gaps in
knowledge and the associated data requirements for studying these gaps. Hence, this section
also attempts to illustrate where knowledge is lacking and where economics as a science can
contribute.
Before moving on to our structural analysis we brieﬂy discuss the concept of human-induced
insecurity in a bit more detail. Section (2) attempts to deﬁne human-induced insecurities, and to
identify the overlap and the dierences between terrorism and organized crime as two sources of
human-induced insecurities. Both concepts have a decent amount of overlap, but there are also
important dierences.
2 Deﬁning human-induced insecurities
We deﬁne human-induced insecurities as insecurities resulting from action undertaken by agents
that result in damage to third person and/or their property. The damage may be inﬂicted on
purpose or accepted as a by product. Terrorism and organized crime are examples of human
induced insecurities, but are more narrowly deﬁned. Our deﬁnition of human induced insecurity
would for example also includes risk of dying in trac.
There is one key property that sets apart insecurity that is human-induced from natural
hazards. Where terrorist’s or criminals are continuously interacting with governments, media
and the people, nature generally does not change its course in response to human action. It is
obvious that there is some degree of interdependency between actors on multiple sides of the
action, i.e., the perpetrators (of e.g., the terrorists or the criminals), the victims or potential targets
as well as those responsible for security (e.g., governments). The fact that there is interaction and
decisionmaking in the system oers scope for economists –as specialists in analyzing strategic
behavior in systems– to study these topics.
The following two sections shortly overview the conventional deﬁnitions of terrorism and
organized crime, that exist in the literature. We add to the deﬁnition by arguing that for studying
the topic we need to deﬁne the threat(s) of terrorism as a multidimensional concept.
2.1 Terrorism
There is no clear agreed upon deﬁnition of the term ”terrorism”. The United Nations for example
have been struggling with a deﬁnition for years. However, a deﬁnition widely used in the
3economicliteratureonterrorismisthatofEndersandSandler(1993). Accordingtothisdeﬁnition,
”terrorism is the premeditated use - or threatened use - of extra normal violence or force to gain
a political objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience usually beyond the
immediate victims.”
Terrorismisofatwo-sidedasymmetricalnature(Stepanova,2008). Onepartoftheasymmetry
is the state or a group of states, whereas the opponents are terrorist movements or groups which
use the targeting of civilians as a ”force multiplier” in order to compensate for its otherwise
conventional military weakness. There seem to be three key characteristics that distinguishes
terrorism from other forms of violence (see e.g., Stepanova (2008), Tavares (2004)). 1. Terrorists
(groups) pursue political goals. This distinguishes terrorism from crime, that tends to be eco-
nomically driven. 2. Terrorists tend to target civilians directly in their attacks. The targeting
of civilians distinguishes terrorism from other types of political violence, e.g., guerrilla tactics,
or war. 3. Beyond the immediate victims of an attack, terrorists typically target an audience.
This audience are the state and other civilians. The state is understood as the ultimate intended




and at the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently accomplished through
ruthless disregard of any law, including oences against the person, and frequently in connexion
with political corruption” [Deﬁnition of the United Nations 1975, 8].
What probably distinguishes organized crime most from regular economic activities, is not
onlytheproductionandprovisionofillegalgoodsandservices,buttheenforcementofcontractual
exchangenotbylawsandcourtsbutthecriminalorganizationitself(KumarandSkaperdas,2008).
There are various ways from that organized crime can emerge, but they all base on costly and
imperfect enforcement of property rights by the state (Kumar and Skaperdas, 2008). The authors
distinguish between four possible factors contributing to the emergence of organized crime:
geographic distance and inaccessibility from the centers of power (state authority), ethnic and
social alienation of groups, power vacuums created by revolutions, wars and major political
change, and the prohibition of the production and distribution of certain goods and services by
the state.
4TheprototypeforconceptsoforganizedcrimeistheItalianmaﬁa(Shelley2005). Bycorrupting
and penetrating state activities, traditional crime groups create collusive relationships with the
state. Thus their existence and performance very much depends on the economic development
of the state and its ﬁnancial institutions, even on international ﬁnancial systems (Shelley 2005).
Organized crime groups can engage in three broad social strategies (Cockayne 2007): symbiotic
(they coexist with authorities and seek their protection from the law and rivals), parasitic (the
groups target authorities not only for protection but also for revenues), and predatory (they prey
on authority and state structures).
However, beside the traditional type of organized crime there exists another type which’s
groups have emerged in conﬂict zones after the end of the Cold War - new transnational crime
groups. They often exploit the disorder of states and regions for their economic purposes and
thus have no interest in the conﬂicts being resolved. Factors that have facilitated their growing
appearance are the increasing global economy, free international movement of people and trade,
free-marketmovementofgoods,improvementsincommunicationandtransportation(Bouloukos
et. al. 2003). Often these crime groups are not hierarchically structured like the traditional ones
(Shelley 2005).
Many of the newer crime groups are also willing to cooperate with terrorists groups. They
might not share the ideological motivations, but they make common cause in exploiting the
absence of an eective state (Shelley 2006). There are two theories about the relationship between
crime and terror groups (Cockayne 2007): One suggests that terrorist groups resort to criminal
meansandnetworksinordertosupplyanddistributetoolsandpropaganda,andcriminalgroups
might revert to terror groups for enforcement capacities. The other suggests that both might
converge on an institutional level (methods of organization, tactics and motivation). However,
therelationshipbetweenorganizedcrimeandterrorismisstillneithertheoreticallynorempirically
well understood (Cockayne 2007), and will remain an important subject for further research.
3 What can economists contribute to the ﬁeld of research on
terrorism?
This section is the core of this note. From this point on we are focussing the analysis on terrorism.
The framework we introduce could be also used for studying the issue of organized crime. Yet,
it requires new deﬁnitions of threats.
5Given the deﬁnition of terrorism we move on to a related concept: the threats to society that
are associated with terrorism. We argue that the threats associated with terrorism can be broadly
classiﬁed in three fundamentally distinct groups:
1. Direct tangible costs of a terrorist incident. This would represent for example the replacement
costs of property damage after a terrorist incident.
2. Direct intangible ‘cost’ of terrorism. This would constitute loss of lives after an attack, but also
fear or social tensions in relation to terrorist activity, etc.
3. Second order eects. Which would for example be a decrease in economic activity, or a stock-
market crash after a terrorist attack (Note that this could be due to increased social tensions
or fear).
It is possible that we have not been exhaustive by specifying the above three groups. Yet, for now
we are adopting the above concepts of threats.
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The variable T will be important in the subsequent analysis. T stands for ‘threat’, as it is the threat
of terrorism that makes terrorism –as deﬁned by Enders and Sandler (1993)– as bad (or as trivial)
as it is. T is deﬁned to be time t speciﬁc in the subsequent analysis (i.e., Tt or Tt+1).
To pinpoint the merits of economics research in the ﬁeld of human induced insecurities or
terrorism we are setting up a framework. In this framework we are modeling the policymaker’s
cost-beneﬁt analysis regarding the ﬁght against terrorism (or organized crime for that matter).
Policymakers are faced with the dicult task of allocating resources eciently in anti-terrorism
or anti-crime policy. (Note, that this is a stylized environment. In reality policymakers also have
other objectives that may interfere with decisionmaking on anti-terror policy.) We assume that
policymakers strive to balance out the risk related to terrorism and the costs of anti-terror policy.
In practice, determining whether risk and costs are in balance is a dicult matter and an
open question for debate. With this note we attempt to contribute to this debate. Either way,
6policymakers need to identify the ‘threats’ and how much they cost to society. For analyzing
these concepts economic research may be of great help.
3.1 The objective of the policymaker
For making adequate (or ecient) decisions regarding anti-terrorism policy, policymakers face a
fairlystraightforwardcostbeneﬁtanalysis. WerefertoourvariableT capturingthethreedierent
threats to society. We add the t+1 subscript to make the variable time speciﬁc. In the subsequent
analysis we are considering a two-period horizon. At t all policy decisions are made, and at t + 1
Tt+1 materializes. Tt+1 represents the vector of threats of terror at t + 1. (We explicitly talk of the
threats of terrorism, instead of the threat of a terrorist attack. Society might also bear ‘costs’ if no
actual attack materializes. It is likely that in the years following up on 9/11 the global costs in
terms of fear –for example– have increased dramatically.)
Tt+1 is the materialization of the threat in t + 1, such that from the perspective of a policy-
maker living in t we should be uncertain about its actual outcome. Therefore we speak of a
random outcome variable. Even though Tt+1 is unknown in advance, it might still be possible to
attach probabilities to certain outcomes of Tt+1. Attaching probabilities to outcomes speciﬁes the
probability distribution of Tt+1.
The fact that Tt+1 is a random variable does not prevent policymakers from inﬂuencing its
outcome beforehand. It is therefore perhaps more useful to talk about the probability distribution
of Tt+1 conditional on anti-terror policy (that the respective institutions have decided upon) and
the information available to the policymaker at t. For example, policymakers could increase the
size of intelligence agencies to decrease the probability of a future terrorist attack. (If anti-terror
policy is able to avert a terrorist attack it is likely to have a positive inﬂuence on all three concepts
of threat.)







interested in particular properties of the conditional distribution function f. Such properties may
betheconditionalexpectationorperhapstheconditionalvariance(i.e.,thespread)oftheoutcome
variable Tt+1. Just for expositional purposes we assume that policymakers are only interested in
the expectation (or the expected value) of the threat of terrorism, conditional on its own actions.
(So, not on the spread (or variance) of the outcome for example.)









+ monetary cost of policyg (2)
We introduce a new concept c representing a vector of the monetary costs associated with the
threat vector Tt+1. For simplicity we assume that c –the monetary cost of Tt+1– is non-stochastic.
Policymakers aim to minimize the sum of the expected monetary costs of the treats conditional
on their own policy actions, and the monetary costs of (anti-terror) policy, when choosing their
policies. The subsequent sections elaborate on equation (2) and identify how economic research
could contribute to the policymakers objective.
Wecouldthinkofthepolicymakersobjectiveasminimizingtheexpectedtotalcostofterrorism
at t + 1. The total cost adds up the expected costs of terrorism at t + 1 measured in monetary
terms, and the investment costs in anti terror policies. Policymakers are interested in minimizing
this objective function by choosing anti-terror policy actions. When anti-terror policy actions are
chosen in such a way that it minimizes the total costs of terrorism, one says anti-terror policy
is ecient (i.e., one additional euro that is spent in anti-terror policy would decrease the costs
of terrorism by an amount that is less than one euro. Hence the returns in terms of a expected
decrease in threat are lower than the investment costs).
3.2 The job of an economist
Conditional on the policymaker’s objective on deterring terrorism –by minimizing the sum of the
expected monetary cost of terrorism and the monetary cost of policy actions– economist may use
their knowledge to help. We argue that the job of an economist may be twofold. First, economists
may use their tools to attach monetary values to the dierent materializations of the threat level
Tt+1 and hence estimate the vector of costs c. Second, economists can study the dynamics of the
system causing Tt+1, and may therefore estimate the properties of f, the conditional distribution
of Tt+1. Economists have developed tools to attach monetary values to non-tangible or partly
tangible concepts like terrorism. It is not fundamentally dicult to estimate the replacement cost
of a building that has been destroyed in a terrorist’s attack (the ﬁrst entry of Tt+1). Yet, calculating
monetary losses due to partly tangible eects –like losses of life, social tension, fear– are a lot less
straightforward. Economist have developed methods and theories of how to do that.
Thirdly, econometrics has shown its merits in estimating causal eects from non-experimental
8data. Econometrics therefore may shed light on the causal relationship between (economic)
aggregates like GDP, trade ﬂows or unemployment rates and terrorism. This type of research is
necessary to quantify the cost of terrorism c.
We are subsequently interested in attaching probabilities to certain outcomes of Tt+1. That
is, economists may help understanding the dynamics of the system to subsequently estimate
probabilities of certain outcomes. We would be interested for example in how investments in the
police force would aect the general perceptions of safety by the population and the actual level
of terrorist activity.
3.2.1 Estimating the cost of terrorism
We have modeled the objective of the policymaker as a tradeo between expected beneﬁts from
investing in anti-terror policy and costs of anti-terror policy. For making this tradeo eciently
we have argued that economists can contribute to the estimation of the monetary costs of Tt+1
and the probabilities attached to the of the outcome of Tt+1. This section is about estimating c as
the monetary costs associated with the vector of threats Tt+1.
Tt+1 itself may be interpreted as a cost incurred on society. Terrorism may incur fear related
‘costs’, or it may incur a ‘cost’ by increasing tensions between dierent ethnic groups. But it
may also impact on economic aggregates like GDP, trade ﬂows or unemployment rates. This
broad deﬁnition of costs simply has many appearances. We would think of the direct costs of
rebuilding the twin towers after the 9/11 attacks. Obviously the true costs go much further than
just these replacement costs. Thousands of people got killed during the incident (not to mention
the number of people that got killed during the U.S. lead ‘war on terror’), but an even larger
group got frightened. Moreover, we could think of more indirect costs as 9/11 might incurred a
negative shock to the world economy.
These dierent broader cost types are hard to compare. What is worse: a one percent increase
in the unemployment rate or an increase in self-reported fear levels? We would not have a
straightforward way of answering this question. Yet, policymakers make these tradeos on a
daily basis. The problem with answering such a question is that both concepts are typically
measured using dierent units of quantity. For making policy evaluations, comparing values
measured using dierent units of quantity becomes increasingly dicult. It is like comparing
apples and oranges.
Thevectorofthreatsalsomeasures‘costs’usingdierentunitsofquantity. Wherereplacement
9costs of the damaged property can be measured in dollars or euros, wellbeing is often measured
using a utility concept. The cost vector c is intended to transform Tt+1 –that consists of three
concepts of threats– into one dollar or euro amount. Translating Tt+1 by multiplying it with its
vector of costs c decreases the dimension from a multidimensional issue (monetary, utility, or
other types of costs) to a one dimensional issue (only a monetary cost). Translating the threat
of terrorism into one single dollar/euro amount is of great interest to policymakers, as it can
be relatively easily compared with investments in anti-terror policy that are also measured in
monetary terms. We could say that the cost of terrorism is equivalent to the threat of terrorism
Tt+1, yet measured in monetary terms, i.e., c  Tt+1. 1
It is certainly not easy to attach some monetary value to the loss of lives or to the increased
anxiety or fear levels in the country. However, estimating the monetary costs of less tangible
issues can be done. Frey, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2008) for example estimate how much income
people would be willing to give up to live in areas less prone to terrorism. Their approach relates
incomes to the disutility of living in a terrorism-prone area of the world. Their method in the
end attaches a euro amount to terrorism. The idea of using utility losses in terms of measuring
negative satisfaction can in this framework also be translated into ’measuring’ the emotional
aspects/eects of insecurities. Risk averse individuals would report higher well-being or life
satisfaction in situations without uncertainty/insecurity/and risk than with ambiguities, given all
other circumstances being equal.
Furthermore, we would also be interested in estimating the cost of terrorism in terms of
reduced economic activity after a terrorist attack. A number of economic studies have been
conductedontheconsequencesofterrorismattheaggregatelevelandonspeciﬁcsectors. Terrorist
attacks can have very speciﬁc consequences on consumption and investment behavior, capital
ﬂows and trade across borders, tourism etc. [e.g., Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2008), Drakos and Kutan (2003), Enders and Sandler (1996)]. The direct costs of
terrorist attacks on aggregate output are considered relatively low and short-term. However,
high and persistent levels of terror and concentrated terror in one region can lead to considerable
impacts on economic growth [see Llussa and Tavares (2007) for an overview].
To sum up this section we argue that all of the materializations of Tt+1 bear costs on society.
Either these costs are easily measurable in euro amounts (replacement costs, or shocks to GDP)
or they are not (losses of lives, wellbeing, or increased social tension). It is of interest for the
1It is also possible that research is focussing on eects, without expressing the eects in terms of euros or dollars, but using
some other value of quantity. Comparison with investment in anti-terror policy will consequently be dicult.
10policymaker to capture all threats to society in euro amount in order to make them comparable
for making ecient policy tradeos. We argue that this is one of the two important jobs of the
economist in helping to make ecient policy decisions. The second job is equally important and
will be the subject of the next section.
3.2.2 Analyzing system dynamics and estimating probabilities
Economics as a social science may help to understand the underlying system dynamics causing
terrorism (e.g., motivations of terrorist’s). This will answer some important policy questions and
hopefully propose clear-cut policy solutions. Clearly, if we better understand the motivations
of terrorists policymakers are better equipped to avert their plans. One of the key messages
of Alan Krueger’s overview on terrorism is that the widely accepted poverty breeds terrorism
notion seems to be false (Krueger, 2007). Based on empirical analyses he argues that terrorists
are typically middle-income and reasonably well educated. This pattern is found consistently
within and between countries. Promoting education therefore may not have the intended eect
of down-sizing the pool of potential terrorists. This is a new insight from economic research on
terrorism.
Even though there is a lot of criticism on the underlying assumptions of main stream (i.e.,
neo-classical) economics as a science, it has a proven track record on analyzing many dierent
aspects of the economy for decades (such as labor related issues, economic growth or trade ﬂows,
to name a few). People have realized that economics as a science may be also applied to other
ﬁelds of research (see for example Steve Levitt’s and Stephen Dubner’s book Freakonomics (2005)
where they for example study the eects of abortion laws on crime rates in the U.S. (Levitt and
Dubner, 2005)). Human induced threats to security may also well-suited to be analyzed within
conceptual frameworks that were initially designed to study ﬁrms or for analyzing households.
Krueger (2007) argues that a terrorist’s organization may be studied as if it were a ﬁrm. Instead of
maximizing proﬁts (as a neo-classical ﬁrm would do) terrorist’s organizations maximize another
objective. Terrorists perhaps maximize exposure that enables them to get their messages across.
Similar to a neo-classical ﬁrm, a terrorist’s organization would keep costs low by trying to hire
”workers” that are capable of doing the job they are hired for against minimum costs.
For analyzing a complex world it is often useful to simplify the world into manageable pieces
by building models. Modeling oers a way to set the stage for analyzing complex phenomena
like the dynamic interaction between governments, terrorists, media and the public. As opposed
11to other social sciences (like sociology or psychology) economic science oers a very strong and
useful concept: the concept of (general) equilibrium. (General) equilibrium is reached when all
parties apply their optimal strategy conditional on the other parties’ optimal strategy. (This is
in fact a Nash equilibrium.) The equilibrium concept proposes what we might see happening in
society and therefore oers a way of testing the underlying assumptions/properties of the model
using data. The equilibrium property of neo-classical economic analysis is a powerful tool for
testing the validity of theories involving a multiple of interacting agents.
The development of economic models of terrorist’s organizations is still in the early stages
of development. Economic models used to analyze ﬁrms should be tailored to the match the
importantpropertiesofterrorist’sorganizationsormaﬁagroups. Itisnotourintentiontopropose
how economic theorists should go about their business. In this section however, we discuss
some of the available economic studies and some of the concepts that are used in terrorism and
organized crime. Economic research so far has contributed to understanding structural patterns
of association, power structures and activities of organized crime, and determinants of terrorism
and its eects in aggregate and on various sectors of the economy, and on individual wellbeing.
However, little is known about eects of policies deterring and combating organized crime and
terrorism. This is partly due to the lack of data giving information on public spending, risks,
and the characteristics of activities. We continue with a somewhat more technical analysis. The
analysis facilitates the classiﬁcation of the existing literature on the causes of terrorism, and
subsequently identiﬁes data accessability on explicit counter terror actions as an important issue
that frustrates econom(etr)ic research that would be useful to policymakers. However, we also
claim that without this particular data a lot of important analyses can be done.
Let’s assume for the moment we are able to estimate the non-stochastic cost vector c that is
associated with the threat vector Tt+1. Multiplying costs with threats yields the threat level in
monetary terms c  Tt+1, i.e., how much the (future) state Tt+1 costs to society in terms of euros.
Having estimated the costs vector c is getting us only halfway. Because we are interested in the
state of the world at t + 1 we must know a good deal about the distribution of Tt+1 (conditional
on policy actions). (There is some inherent uncertainty in relation with terrorism. It is the fear of
what might happen in the future that makes terrorism into an eective combat tactic.)
Tomeetthepolicymakersobjectivewedonotneedhoweverfullinformationontheconditional
distribution function f. For making ecient policy evaluations we only need an estimate of the






12The conditional expectation is just the ﬁrst moment of the conditional distribution function. We
can remain ambiguous about other –higher order– moments of f. Econometric models of causes
and eects tend to be set up as to estimate conditional expectations functions. Therefore, much
of the existing empirical work can be readily used in policy evaluations.
Inthissectionweareinterestedintheworkingofthesystem(theworldinrelationtoterrorism)
in response to anti-terror policy. The bulk of the empirical research relating to terrorism has been





. Most of the studies
aimtoestimatecausaleectsfromsomevariableX onterrorism. Therehavebeenmanyexamples
ofX. Incontrasttowidespreadbeliefsforexample,evidencesuggeststhatterroristengagementis
associated neither with poor education nor economic status (e.g., Krueger and Maleckova (2003),
Berrebi (2003)). Dierent approaches have been oered to explain terrorism and the build up of
terrorist groups, and to show factors that can aect the intensity and nature of terrorist activities
(see e.g., by Hardin (1995), Wintrobe (2006), Berman and Laitin (2005), Laitin and Shapiro (2007).






. Studying all these concepts in isolation gives insight
in the working of single pieces of a larger puzzle. A greater set of pieces could eventually provide
a more complete picture of the issue at hand.
However, from the results of studies done so far we are not able to be conclusive about the
conditional expectation function that we are after. Schematically, we could present the eects of
policy investments on Tt+1 as follows:
policy !1 X !2 Tt+1
policy  !3 Tt+1
(3)
where the top relationship represents the indirect (causal) eects of policy on terrorism. Invest-
ments in education might decrease dissatisfaction and as such decrease the risk of terrorism (this
is just an example and not necessarily representing reality). The bottom relationship represent
the direct relationship between policy action and the threat of terror. Reinforcing intelligence
agencies might deter terrorists and so decrease the threat of terrorism to society. Most of the
studies cited above are associated with arrow 2, i.e., the eects of some concept X on terrorism.
Yet, for eective policy decision making we need information on all arrows in (3).
Let’sseehowthiswouldworkinaregressionframework. Weassumeforexpositionalreasons
13that conditional expectation functions are linear and additive in their arguments.2 Let’s say that
we can discriminate policy that is intended to aect terrorism directly (Pa, where the a stands for
anti-terror) and policy that has only a potential indirect eect on terrorism through X. This type
of policy we call PX. Therefore policy = fPa;PXg.
































































If we assume that conditional expectation functions are linear and additive in their arguments we









































Because recent empirical studies on the causes of terrorism tend to focus of the eects of some
X on terrorism we merely have estimates for 1 (a parameter that measures the causal impact of
Xt on Tt+1). The parameters 2 and 3 that form an essential part of the conditional expectation
function that we are after, cannot be retrieved from these particular studies. Perhaps we may
use empirical studies from dierent ﬁelds to obtain estimates of 3 (a parameter that estimates
the impact of policy investments on Xt). However, without sucient data access to policy
investments that are intended to target terrorism directly, there is (perhaps) hardly any hope of
2This would constitute to a ﬁrst order approximation of the true conditional expectation functions. The linearity and
additivity assumption is widespread in applied statistical work.
3To go from equation (10) to equation (11) we impose that Pa
t has no eect on Xt after conditioning on PX
t
14retrieving convincing estimates for 2. It may sound obvious, that without data on anti-terror
policies empirical researchers have hard time measuring its eectiveness. From a more positive
perspective however, it seems quite well possible to obtain estimates of 1 and 3 from the data








Using the example of the threat of terrorism as one type of human-induced insecurities this note
deﬁnes and analyzes the most important issues concerning decisionmaking about those kind of
insecurities from the perspective of a policymaker. The policymaker’s objective is to minimize
the total costs of a security threat.
We deﬁned the threat of terrorism to consist of three components: 1. direct replacement costs
of a terrorist’s attack, 2. direct intangible or partly tangible eects of terrorism (this constitutes to
losses of lives, social tension and fear), 3. indirect, second order eects, like negative shocks to
GDP or trade. With deﬁning these three groups we have tried to be exhaustive. The total costs of
terrorism are the sum of the monetary equivalent of the threats deﬁned and the monetary costs
of investing in anti-terror policy.
We argue that economists possibilities of helping policymakers making ecient policy de-
cisions is twofold. First, economists can use their techniques to estimate and attach monetary
amounts to the three types of threats we have deﬁned. Second, economists can use their tech-
niques to analyze the system causing human-induced insecurities in general and terrorism in
particular.
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